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Some kind of freedom call it "freedom of action" is undermined by 
ropes, chains and other physical constraints. And there is something that all 
of these constraints have in common something that makes them all con- 
straints: they stand as obstacles to the realization of certain choices.l Freedom 
of action, then, is dependency of conduct on choice; the reason that physical 
constraints undermine this kind of freedom is that they interfere with such 
dependency. The question needing to be tackled is this: What more does a 
full-fledged free agent an agent who has all the kinds of freedom that we 
worry about when we worry about "the free will problem" need beyond this 
rather limited kind of freedom? Sometimes nothing but fear and apathy, for 
instance, prevent us from coming to another's rescue; sometimes we are less 
than full-fledged free agents despite the fact that we are not tied down, our 
phones lines are not cut. We can be unfree even when nothing interferes with 
the efficacy of our choices, for things like fear and apathy can perniciously 
influence what we choose. What we lack in such circumstances is freedom of 
will. But what, if anything, is freedom of will? 
This paper argues that two broad strategies for answering this question are 
mistaken. Many philosophers who have offered substantive theories of free- 
dom of will have followed one or the other of these two strategies. The result is 
that we need a new approach. Towards the end, I suggest an alternative ap- 
proach and give some reasons for thinking it promising. 
The strategies which I am attacking here, and that which I propose, all de- 
pend on a particular conception of what we are doing when we offer an analysis 
of freedom. In particular, I assume throughout that a choice or action possesses 
a particular kind of freedom because of something about either what causes it, 
or the manner through which it is caused. We know, roughly, what feature an 
action's causal history must exhibit to be an instance of freedom of action: it must 
be caused by a choice to do it, where the choice is causally crucial: in the ab- 
sence of the choice the agent would not have so acted. But what must the causal 
history of a choice be like for the choice to manifest freedom of will? 
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What this approach implies is that those with a certain kind of incompati- 
bilist bent are simply not going to be convinced by the view which I propose 
any more than they are convinced by the views which I attack. That is, there 
are those who think that the question of an agent's freedom with respect to 
what she does or chooses turns entirely on the modal limits placed on her po- 
tential choice or action by her circumstances or psychology. They see the ques- 
tion of whether or not an agent is free as being the question of whether or not, 
given relevantly similar circumstances and a relevantly similar psychological 
state, she "could" have chosen or done otherwise. For theorists of this sort, the 
central question about freedom is really a modal question turning on the pre- 
cise modality expressed by the word "could". There are, of course, many senses 
of "could" under which it is always false that we "could" have done or chosen 
otherwise than we did given the very same circumstances if, for instance, the 
only things that "could" occur are those that did occur and there are other 
sense in which it is sometimes true and sometimes false depending on the na- 
ture of our circumstances and psychological states. The discussion here simply 
doesn't speak to those who construe the free will question as, ultimately, a ques- 
tion about the precise modality expressed by the word "could". 
Answers to broadly metaphysical questions such as the question of what 
it is to possess freedom of will are often driven by some intuitive, but unsys- 
tematic, prior conception of the nature of that which is to be explained. Ac- 
counts of the nature of freedom of will have tended to fall into one of two 
camps, corresponding to two different pictures of what freedom of will is. For 
some, freedom of will is to be equated with self-expression in choice. Accord- 
ing to this picture, the more our choices are ours, are grounded in and arise 
from something important about us, the more we approach freedom of will. 
For others, freedom of will is to be equated with self-transcendence. The agent 
who has freedom of will, on this conception, has a will that is responsive to 
and aimed at those aspects of her circumstances that are of genuine value, that 
are worthwhile guides of her choice; she is not a slave to herself, but manages 
to allow her will to express that which is worth expressing.2 
Self-expression views are aimed at providing accounts of self-determination 
that are consistent with roughly naturalistic metaphysical assumptions. For self- 
expression theorists, self-determination is to be understood as causation of choice 
by certain events and states which, because of their relations to one another or 
to other states and events of the agent, constitute the kind of self that is crucial 
for moral responsibility, or for other forms of assessment that we might want to 
levy on an agent in response to a judgment of her freedom. According to such 
views, it is because her actions or choices express that is, depend causally 
upon deep structures in, or even constitutive of, the self that the agent can be 
said to have freedom of will. 
I use the term "transcendence" to refer to self-transcendence views 
because for those who believe freedom of will to be equated with self- 
transcendence with responsiveness to the evaluative or appropriately reason- 
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giving facts the ultimate explanation for the claim that a particular agent's 
choice manifests freedom of will appeals to the fact that her choice is pegged 
to some fact not about her, but about her environment. Susan Wolf gives an 
example which might help here.3 Wolf describes two different agents both of 
whom answer "Carson City" to the question "What is the capital of Nevada?". 
The first gives this answer because she has been taught to so answer, the sec- 
ond because, in fact, the capital of Nevada is Carson City. The explanation for 
the second agent's answer appeals to the truth of the answer; the fact that she 
gave the answer she did is explained by citing the fact that that is the right 
answer. Similarly, the choices of the self-transcendent agent can be explained 
by citing the fact that what she chose was evaluatively optimal; she chooses 
as she does because what she chooses is best. Since egoistic subjectivism about 
value is false what is best for an individual to choose is never a function 
solely of facts about herself the choices of the self-transcendent agent are 
thought to be free not because they arise out of and depend upon aspects of 
herself (although they may) but, rather, because they arise out of and depend 
upon those features of her circumstances and psychology on which the value 
of what she chooses supervenes. 
These two traditions of thought on the nature of freedom of will point to 
two distinct strategies for offering a philosophical analysis of the concept. Those 
who follow the first, hold self-expression to be both necessary and sufficient 
for freedom; those who follow the second, hold self-transcendence to be. Sub- 
stantive theories of freedom of will can be developed by following these strat- 
egies and providing criteria which must be satisfied by self-expressive and 
self-transcendent agents, respectively. But, as I argue here, no matter how these 
criteria are formulated, both strategies are fundamentally flawed. Neither self- 
expression nor self-transcendence is either necessary or sufficient for freedom 
of will. It would be a mistake, however, to simply abandon these strategies 
entirely, for self-expression and self-transcendence are, somehow, relevant to 
an analysis of the concept of freedom. I go on to suggest that what this shows, 
although not definitively, is that a particular assumption about the nature of 
the concept of freedom of will is false. The debate over the nature of freedom 
of will has proceeded from the assumption sometimes explicit sometimes 
implicit that freedom of will is a descriptive concept, a concept of metaphys- 
ics. But, perhaps this is false. Perhaps, rather, freedom of will is a "thick 
concept"4, a concept that is not purely descriptive, but also imputes a certain 
form of value to that which falls properly under it. To reach this conclusion, I 
claim, is to draw an inference to the best explanation: there are certain facts 
which are best explained if freedom of will is a "thick" concept. But more of 
this later. 
My discussion is informed by a distinction between desire and will. On 
one natural conception of the will although not the conception that I will be 
using here all desires or desiderative attitudes are acts of will. This is to coun- 
tenance a distinction between beliefs attitudes with mind-to-world direction 
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of fit and desires attitudes with world-to-mind direction of fitS while de- 
nying there to be any important difference between willings and desires. On 
this conception, to want something is to will it. For my purposes here, how- 
ever, it is important to note subcategories among the generic category of men- 
tal states with world-to-mind direction of fit. "Desires", as I will be using the 
term, are occurrent mental states that motivate us to act in ways useful (relative 
to our beliefs) for their satisfaction, but which are not governed by the same 
norms of consistency and coherence that govern willings.6 It is irrational, for 
instance, to will both A and not-A, while it is not irrational to desire a state of 
affairs and at the same time desire that it not occur7. While there may be cer- 
tain norms of rationality that govern desires, they are not the norms of consis- 
tency and coherence that govern choices. So, I divide the class of motivational 
states as follows: All motivational states have a world-to-mind direction of fit. 
Among those, some are governed by certain standards of rationality such as 
coherence and consistency and some are not. Those that are are willings, and 
this class includes a fairly wide range of mental states choices, volitions, 
intentions that may differ from one another but not in ways that are impor- 
tant for our purposes. Those that are not are to be called "desires". 
It follows that it is possible not to will, or even to will contrary to, an 
action that one performs. While we may never act without a motive, we may 
very well be motivated by a desire rather than a choice, volition or intention. 
Notice that the word "action" is being used here in a broad sense. Volitional 
theories of action, for instance, reserve the word "action" for those events or 
states that are caused by volitions or other willings. There is much that is right 
about volitional theories, but, I will use the term "action" to refer to any state 
or event caused appropriately by a motive (although I simply won't give flesh 
to the word "appropriately" in this formulation) and leave open the possibility 
that states or events caused appropriately by willings have some important sta- 
tus (perhaps such events are intentional or voluntary actions). 
One final preliminary point. In a number of places I draw on the idea of 
action performed "for a particular reason". I assume that the relation between a 
reason, or a mental representation of a reason, on the one hand, and an action 
performed for that reason, on the other, is causal. To act for a reason is for 
one's action to be caused in some special way by the feature of the world that 
is reason-giving, or by one's mental representation of a reason-giving feature, 
or, perhaps, by both. This is not a substantive theory of what it is to act for a 
reason, for I have not said what the relevant causal relation is. What is impor- 
tant for my purposes is only that actions performed for reasons have no special 
features that cannot be countenanced by a fully naturalistic theory of the men- 
tal. Just as an action's or choice's freedom is to be found in features of it's 
causal history, so too the distinctive mark of acting for a reason is to be found 
in features of the causal relation between the reason (or mental representation 
of it) and the action performed for the reason. 
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A Lesson from Standard Compatibilism 
In the history of philosophy, at least one figure of towering importance 
thought that we didn't need a theory of freedom of will at all. Hobbes held that 
freedom of action was both necessary and sufficient for full-fledged freedom.8 
Hobbes was probably wrong. One way of diagnosing his error helps us to see 
the mistake that is made in equating self-expression with freedom of will. Let's 
formalize this view as follows: 
The Standard Compatibilist Thesis: An agent has full-fledged freedom with 
respect to action A iff (1) If she chooses to A she will A, and (2) If she 
does not choose to A, she will not.9 l0 
Even Hobbes encountered the following objection to this viewll: the truth of 
conditionals (1) and (2) is not sufficient for freedom. There are unfree agents 
made unfree not by things like ropes and chains, but, instead, by psychological 
disorders, coercion, indoctrination, sometimes childhood trauma, and, in cer- 
tain circumstances, even ignorance of the facts. But these forces undermine 
freedom not because they are obstacles to the realization of choices, but be- 
cause they perniciously influence choice. Standard Compatibilism ignores, or 
dogmatically denies, that this is even possible.l2 
The Standard Compatibilist can respond to this objection by claiming that 
even the pernicious factors (psychological disorders, coercion, etc.) are obsta- 
cles to the realization of our choices and, hence, make the relevant conditionals 
false. And, this response seems, at first glance, to be satisfactory if, to take one 
illustrative example, coercive threats lead to action without that action being 
chosen. Perhaps, the Standard Compatibilist might say, when someone receives 
a coercive threat, overpowering desires are raised in her which bring her to 
comply with the threat regardless of what she chooses to do. Her desires con- 
trol her action, the Standard Compatibilist might insist, thus detaching her will 
from the causal etiology of her compliant performance. Or, while she may choose 
to comply with the threat-induced desire, the desire would have, itself, been 
sufficient to bring about her compliant action regardless of what she chose. 
This Standard Compatibilist response relies on a seemingly implausible ac- 
count of coercion, but what, exactly, is wrong with it? 
One way to respond to this question is to begin with another: Is coerced 
action, on the Standard Compatibilist's analysis, intentional action? If not, then, 
on the Standard Compatibilist's analysis of coercion, coercion undermines free- 
dom by undermining the intentionality, or voluntariness, of the actions it in- 
duces. The trouble is that many coerced acts that are rightly described as 
unfree-acts that are excused with expressions such as "I had no choice, he 
had a gun to my head" are intentional. An agent might coolly calculate the 
results of non-compliance and decide, in the end, that it is better to do as the 
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coercor demands, and, nonetheless, act unfreely. If the force that the coercor 
applies is sufficient to insure compliant action then the agent is unfree even if 
the coercor insures compliant intentional action. To utilize this response to the 
Standard Compatibilist is to shift the ground of debate from a question about 
freedom to a question about intentional action. It remains theoretically open to 
the Standard Compatibilist to insist that it is possible to act intentionally with- 
out one's will playing a crucial role in the causal etiology of action. Thus, the 
Standard Compatibilist might say, coerced actions are intentional, yet unfree, 
precisely because they are intentional actions brought about without the partici- 
pation of the will of the agent. Is there something wrong with the Standard 
Compatibilist's analysis of coercion even if we grant her the possibility that 
coerced action, so analyzed, can be intentional action? That is, can we respond 
to the Standard Compatibilist's analysis of coerced action without shifting the 
debate to consideration of the nature of intentional action? The answer is "yes". 
Start by distinguishing among three things: (1) the behaviors on the part 
of a manipulator that make it right to say that that individual is engaging in 
coercion of another, (2) the action that the manipulated performs as a result of 
and because of the pressures applied by the coercor, and (3) the causal mech- 
anism through which the coercor's behavior succeeds in inducing the compli- 
ant actions of the coerced. The Standard Compatibilist provides an explanation 
for the unfreedom of (2) by appeal to the features of (3); that is, the Standard 
Compatibilist explains the unfreedom of the coerced conduct not by appeal to 
the fact that the conduct is coerced but rather by appeal to the means through 
which the coercive pressures are claimed to have their effect: they induce over- 
powering desires. However, imagine that an agent acts to comply with a co- 
ercive threat for the reason that the coercor has provided: I hand over the money 
precisely so as to avoid being shot. To know that an agent acted for the rea- 
sons supplied by the coercive manipulator is to know that the behaviors re- 
ferred to in (1) cause (2) in some distinctive (undisclosed) way; recall, after 
all, that that is all there is to acting for a reason. But to know that I acted 
unfreely in response to coercion it is sufficient to know that the coercive be- 
haviors provided my reason for acting as I did. In order to determine that I 
am unfree, we don't need to know (3); that is, we don't need to know how, 
precisely, it came to pass that I complied with the manipulator's demands in 
order to know that I am unfree. Thus, the Standard Compatibilist offers an 
explanation for the freedom-undermining force of coercion which is not con- 
sistent with an important pattern in our flow of concepts: our move from "acted 
for the reasons supplied by the manipulator" to "acted unfreely" is not medi- 
ated by any further concept such as "acted as a result of over-powering desires". 
Notice that it does matter to freedom how coercion causes compliant ac- 
tion. That is, the coercive behaviors must provide the reason for the compliant 
action, and must, therefore, cause the action in some distinctive way. However, 
the features of the causal route from coercive pressure to compliant action that 
the Standard Compatibilist appeals to are not the distinctive features of the route 
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from a reason to action performed for that reason. We often act for a particular 
reason without being motivated by over-powering desires. The point is that the 
freedom-undermining force of coercion cannot be explained by appeal to any 
features of the causal chain from coercive pressure to compliant action not al- 
ready possessed by that causal route merely by virtue of the fact that it consti- 
tutes action for the reasons supplied by the coercion. What this implies is that, 
likely, the feature of the causal history of coerced acts by virtue of which those 
acts are unfree will be found merely in the fact that coercion is in their causal 
history and not in the facts about the particular way in which the coercion causes 
them. So long as it is true that it is sufficient for unfreedom to act for the rea- 
sons supplied by the coercor, this must be true, because there is nothing about 
acting for a reason generally which undermines freedom. 
In the discussion so far, much is being built into the idea that the manipu- 
lator supplies the reasons for the action. We often "supply" in some sense of 
"supply" the reasons for the choices of another without thereby coercing that 
other: the chef supplies my reasons for choosing to buy the food by cooking it 
so beautifully; my wife supplies my reasons for choosing to take a trip by be- 
ing the one that I want to travel with. Further, it is very difficult to specify the 
precise difference between the way in which a coercor "supplies" reasons for 
action and the way in which individuals supply such reasons in these cases. 
But such a specification will be part of an account of the nature of coercion. To 
coerce someone is to effectively supply her with reasons to act in some special 
sense of "supply" that I am not specifying here. But when someone else sup- 
plies one's reasons for action in the way that is distinctive of coercion, and one 
chooses in accordance with the reasons so supplied, one chooses without free- 
dom of will. What this means is that the unfreedom which agents experience as 
a result of coercion comes from the fact that coercion is the source of one's 
reasons and not from features of the causal route through which those reasons 
induce compliant choice. 
The Standard Compatibilist, then, provides a sufficient condition for the 
freedom-undermining force of coercion, but doesn't supply the important suf- 
ficient condition, for her explanation doesn't explain why, in general, coercion 
undermines freedom whenever the agent acts for the reasons supplied by the 
coercor's pressures. What this suggests is a very general methodological prin- 
ciple: When providing an explanation for why X undermines freedom, when- 
ever an agent who acts for the reasons that X supplies acts unfreely, we must 
find a connection between X itself and unfreedom and not a connection merely 
between regularly found features of the causal sequence from X to action and 
unfreedom. 
So Standard Compatibilism fails, but fails constructively, for its failure points 
to the need for care when considering how one's theory of full-fledged free- 
dom accounts for the freedom-undermining influence of some particular fea- 
ture of oneself or one's environment. This methodological lesson will become 
important in the next section. 
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Freedom of Will I: The Conditions of Self-Expression 
One approach to understanding the nature of freedom of will starts with 
reflection on what is attractive about the account of freedom of action sketched 
already. While that account does give an explanation for the fact that ropes and 
chains undermine freedom, we can still look deeper: why do we take depen- 
dence of conduct on the will to constitute any form of freedom (even if not all 
that we take full-fledged freedom to be)? One possible answer and there is 
another possible answer to be discussed in the next section is this: when an 
agent's conduct depends on her will then part of what happens in the world 
tracks something about her; to know that an agent had freedom of action when 
she acted is to see particular occurrences (her bodily movements and certain of 
their results) as expressive of something about her: what she willed. On the flip 
side, to know that she had freedom of action with respect to an action that she 
did not perform is to know that something that was possible failed to happen 
because of something about her. When we have freedom of action, the way of 
the world (or at least some of it) is expressive of the state of our wills. The 
agent who has freedom of action, then, expresses an aspect of herself. 
Encouraged by this result, we might turn to the cases of psychological dis- 
order and the rest to see whether, perhaps, what those forces undermine is some 
other, deeper form of self-expression. And, in fact, it is something like this 
project that is undertaken by Harry Frankfurt in his widely read paper "Free- 
dom of the Will and the Concept of a Person''.l3 It is not enough for an agent's 
choice what Frankfurt analyzes as, merely, "effective first order desire" to 
be expressed in her conduct for her to be free; deeper facts about her facts 
about her reflective attitudes must be expressed in her choices. Her choices 
must arise from and depend uponl4 these deep structures in the self, thinks Frank- 
furt, if she is to have freedom of will. In later workl5, Frankfurt has made fur- 
ther efforts to specify both what structures of the agent need to be expressed in 
her choices and what relationship her choices must bear to those structures if 
the agent is to have freedom of will. And similar efforts have been exerted by 
other theorists as well.l6 But, as I argue in this section, it is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for the possession of freedom of will to be an agent whose choices 
are self-expressive. 
To see that self-expression is not sufficient for freedom of will, think of 
the very cases that impugned the case for Standard Compatibilism: the cases of 
psychological disorder, coercion and indoctrination. An agent who is subjected 
to certain forms of brainwashing may come out of the treatment a fully inte- 
grated and wholly devoted subject, willing, perhaps, to sacrifice all in order to 
protect any hair on the head of her Leader. When such an agent goes through 
with it whatever it is, and it could be anything, that is just what makes the 
very idea of brainwashing so nightmarish she lacks some kind of freedom...at 
least, so it seems. It is not freedom of action that she lacks (we can suppose), 
so she lacks freedom of will. But why? Those who wish to analyze freedom of 
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will as consisting in self-expression in choice must say one of two things in 
response: (1) the brainwashed don't lack freedom of will (and, hence, since 
they do not lack freedom of action, they are full-fledged free agents), or (2) the 
choices of the brainwashed are not self-expressive, or not self-expressive in the 
right way, or to the degree that they need to be. 
Those who take the first route who deny that the brainwashed lack free- 
dom of will are denying that it is even possible for someone who possesses 
the right kind of psyche who enjoys the specified relationship between deep 
psychic structures and choices-to lack freedom of will. They hold that it is 
inconceivable for someone to purposefully induce those structures and relation- 
ships with the intention of making the agent choose in a certain way as a result 
of and in accordance with those structures and thereby undermine her freedom 
of will. We can see what is wrong with this position with a thought-experiment. 
Imagine that you are a self-expression theorist and you take it to be both nec- 
essary and sufficient for freedom of will that an agent's choice bear relation R 
to psychic structure C. Now imagine that you are given information about a 
particular case in stages. Stage 1: At the moment, agent S has no inclination or 
desire to choose to A, nor ought she according to any fair normative standard. 
Stage 2: Cruella has targeted S and decides to do what it takes to get S to 
choose to A. Stage 3. Cruella develops a plan of attack and executes it. Stage 4: 
S chooses to A as a result of Cruella's machinations. Stage 5: Cruella got S to 
choose to A by causing S to exhibit feature C, which, given the circumstances, 
was sufficient for S to choose to A and for her choice to bear R to C. 
Given the information in Stages 1-4, it seems appropriate to view S as a 
pawn in Cruella's hands: Cruella aims at nothing but S's making of a choice 
that S has no reason, prior to Cruella's machinations, to make. And Cruella 
gets her way. How could this appear to be an instance of freedom of will on S's 
part? And if it does not, then how could it help to be told how Cruella pulled it 
off, as you are told in Stage 5? Notice that there are various elements of the 
case as described that might turn out to be important. Perhaps it is important 
that Cruella aims at inducing compliance of the relevant sort and succeeds. 
That is, perhaps Cruella would not undermine S's freedom of will if she, say, 
performed actions not intended to induce S's compliance but which happened, 
nonetheless, to do so. Those who deny that it is possible to undermine an agent's 
freedom of will through brainwashing that induces the appropriate "mesh" be- 
tween deep psychic structures and choices must deny that factors such as these 
are relevant: a choice that comes about as a result of the right kind of psyche 
exemplifies freedom of will no matter what the source of the relevant psycho- 
logical configuration. 
The trouble with the second possible response the assertion that those 
who are the victims of brainwashing are not actually expressing themselves 
appropriately can be seen by asking the following question: What aspect of 
such an agent is failing to be expressed in her compliant choice? Whatever 
answer is offered her genuinely reflective acts of identification, her true char- 
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acter, her considered self-conception those aspects of the agent can, also, be 
under the control of the brainwasher; if they are, then they too might be ex- 
pressed in the compliant choice of the agent, for exactly what the brainwasher 
does is to cause the crucial elements of the agent's psyche to be pointed to- 
wards compliant action. We might put this point in terms of a challenge: What 
is the difference between a fully-integrated and unconflicted agent who has be- 
come so through some neutral process of training an agent, for instance, who 
has the Aristotelian virtue of bravery and an agent who is just as unconflicted 
and devoted to a certain course of conduct as a result of brainwashing? We 
want to say that the former has freedom of will and the latter does not, but how 
can we say that within a theory that sees freedom of will as consisting in self- 
expression in choice? 
We might try to answer this challenge by insisting that there is some cru- 
cial psychological difference between these two types of agent, a difference 
which manifests itself as a difference in self-expression. We might say, for in- 
stance, that the choices of the brave are available to revision under reflective 
scrutiny in a way that the choices of the brainwashed are not. Hence, the choices 
of the brave in contrast to those of the brainwashed express not just what 
the brave are in fact devoted to, but also what they would be devoted to were 
they to reflect in various ways. The trouble with this response is that it in- 
volves violation of the methodological principle described in the previous sec- 
tion. I explain. 
We are assuming, at this point, that when an agent makes a choice for the 
reasons supplied by a process of brainwashing, she lacks freedom of will. The 
self-expression theorist might explain this by suggesting that brainwashing causes 
choices that are not available to revision under self-scrutiny; even if the brain- 
washed were to recognize after self-scrutiny that the potential choice is faulty, 
she would still choose in that way. This explanation notes a particular feature 
of the causal sequence from brainwashing to compliant choice: it is rigid; it 
cannot be changed even as the result of critical examination that finds it to be 
faulty. But this is not a feature of every causal process from a reason (or a 
mental representation of a reason) to action for that reason; nor is it a feature 
which must be possessed by the causal sequence from manipulative behavior 
to compliant action in order for that manipulative behavior to count as brain- 
washing; and, yet, whenever agents choose for the reasons supplied by a pro- 
cess of brainwashing, they lack freedom of will. Thus, the explanation picks 
out a non-crucial fact about a very large set of cases of choice in response to 
brainwashing and claims it to be the crucial feature. 
An example might help here. In the film The Manchurian Candidate, a 
man is brainwashed in such a way that, afterwards, whenever a phone rings in 
a certain manner, he chooses to do whatever it is that the voice on the other 
end tells him to do. Let's grant that the process is such that even if he were to 
reflectively examine the action he is told to do, and even if were to conclude it 
to be a horrible, unacceptable act, he would still choose to do it. But is this the 
reason that he is unfree? No. All we need to know in order to know that his 
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responsibility for his choice is severely diminished is to know that he chooses 
for the reasons supplied to him by the processes of brainwashing that he has 
undergone. If those are his reasons for choosing as he chose, then we know 
that he lacks freedom of will when he chooses, regardless of the features of the 
causal sequence from brainwashing to choice (except those that are required 
for him to be rightly said to be acting for those reasons). 
The problem here is not specific to this particular explanation for the 
freedom-undermining nature of brainwashing, but is, rather, endemic to any 
explanation that the self-expression theorist might give. The problem is that the 
self-expression theorist tells us that when the causal chain leading to an agent's 
choice has feature Y, then that choice is self-expressive. Then, when faced with 
examples of causal chains leading to choice that have feature Y as a result of 
the manipulation of a brainwasher, the self-expression theorist insists that, in 
fact, brainwashing produces choices only through causal processes that lack 
feature Y, and, further, that is why the relevant choices are made without free- 
dom of will. But, unless feature Y is incompatible with the special features of 
causal sequences by virtue of which those causal sequences are instances of 
taking as a reason, this response shows too much, for it shows that we aren't 
always unfree when our choices are made on reasons supplied by brainwash- 
ing, but only when they are supplied by brainwashing in a particular way. But 
this is false for reasons similar to those suggested by the Cruella example above: 
to know that a manipulator aimed at and succeeded in inducing a choice that 
the agent had no independent reason to make (the information described in stages 
1-4) is to know that the agent's freedom of will is undermined even in the 
absence of knowledge of the particular means through which the manipulator 
succeeded in her endeavor. 
We can see why self-expression is not even necessary for freedom of will 
by reflecting on the following case. "The Dutiful" is an agent who reliably 
chooses in the best possible way, all things considered, given her circum- 
stances. Further, she not only chooses in accord with what is genuinely good, 
she tracks the good: for each of her possible actions, if that action were the 
best of her alternatives, she would choose it. The explanation for the fact that 
she made the choice that she made always appeals to the optimality of that 
choice. Often, although not always, the Dutiful chooses in a self-sacrificial way. 
Her particular desires do not take precedence over the desires of others; she 
chooses as she most desires only when what she most desires accords with what 
is genuinely best for her to do. Now imagine this person put to the test. Imag- 
ine, for instance, that, like Job, everything that she cares about, desires or hopes 
for is taken away from her, and all she needs to do to get it back is to, say, 
renounce God (assume this to be a non-optimal act). But she doesn't; she chooses 
instead to endure her suffering rather than to choose anything other than the 
best of her possible actions. 
Is the choice of the Dutiful self-expressive in the requisite sense? What 
reason is there to think so? The Dutiful's choice is in conflict with every incli- 
nation she has: every desire, every whim, every hope that she has ever held or 
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entertained remains unexpressed, even thwarted, by her choice. We often make 
choices that fail to be expressive of some of our desires: I choose to work in- 
stead of going to the movies not because I don't want to go the movies I 
do but because I need to work. But the case of the Dutiful is different: in 
certain situations, the entire desiderative side of the Dutiful's psyche plays no 
role in the production of her choice and, hence, remains unexpressed, un- 
revealed, by what she chooses. Could an agent whose choices fail to express 
the entire desiderative side of her psyche be self-expressive? If not, then the 
case of the Dutiful shows that self-expression of the requisite sort is not nec- 
essary for freedom of will. 
Again, there are two ways to resist this conclusion: (1) Deny that the Du- 
tiful has freedom of will, or (2) Deny that the choices of the Dutiful fail to be 
self expressive in the requisite sense. Neither answer is satisfactory. 
The trouble with the first of these responses is that there are patterns in our 
practices that favor the thought that the Dutiful possesses freedom of will. For 
instance, when faced with two agents each of which has endured the Dutiful's 
travails where one has chosen as the Dutiful does and the other has given in to 
the substantial pressures to renounce, whom do we pity and whom do we praise? 
It is the latter, and not the former, that seems to have been "swept away", or to 
have not been herself, and the former that seems to have stuck her feet to the 
ground and not allowed herself to be moved by the forces applied to her. While 
she labors under substantial pressures to choose otherwise than she does, she 
does not seem to be under any pressure to choose as she does. How can an 
agent be unfree when she acts contrary to all of the forces that seem to be 
pushing on her? It seems that the primary motivation to deny the freedom of 
will of the Dutiful comes from adherence to an equation between self-expression 
and freedom and not from examination of the facts. 
The trouble with the second response the insistence that the Dutiful is 
self-expressive is as follows: What is it about the Dutiful which is expressed 
in her choice? Say that the answer to this question is "feature C" perhaps C is 
a feature of the Dutiful's character, a deep-seeded evaluative belief, or a dispo- 
sition to engage in deliberative activities that help her to recognize the good. 
What about the case forces us to believe that C is expressed by the Dutiful's 
choice? Well, it seems that the reason to believe C to be expressed is either that 
it is conceptually impossible to make a choice without expressing feature C, or 
else that it is conceptually impossible to choose the good without expressing 
feature C. 
The former answer can't be right since it implies that it is not possible to 
choose without expressing oneself in the way that is taken to be necessary for 
freedom of will. But then this kind of self-expression is an idle condition on 
freedom of will: no one can lack freedom of will by failing to so express one- 
self in choice, since it is not possible to both make a choice and so fail. To 
advocate this response is to return to Standard Compatibilism. 
The latter answer one cannot choose the good without expressing fea- 
ture C is better, but it is still problematic. The easiest way to make sense of it 
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is to think of feature C as a capacity for recognition of the good together with 
the power to take the good as one's reason for action. It seems plausible enough 
that an agent could not really be said to be choosing the good if her choice was 
not expressive of capacities such as these. To express feature C, on this analy- 
sis, is to express something that any agent who chooses the good must express 
in order to be rightly said to be choosing the good. In a sense, feature C is 
given with a choice of the good. This suggests that the fact that the Dutiful's 
choice is self-expressive in this sense is not the crucial fact about the Dutiful 
that accounts for her freedom of will. The Dutiful is an agent who is self- 
transcendent. It is possible that an agent is only self-transcendent if in addition 
to expressing the evaluative facts in her choices, she expresses something about 
herself in her choices (feature C). But the question is this: which feature of the 
Dutiful is accounting for her freedom of will, her self-expression or her self- 
transcendence? If the latter, then self-expression is only necessary for the Du- 
tiful's freedom of will because it is necessary for her self-transcendence. 
Still, nothing said so far speaks definitively against this way of resisting the 
denial of the necessity of self-expression for freedom of will: so far, there is no 
reason to believe the Dutiful to be a counterexample to the claim that self- 
expression is necessary since she has freedom of will and is self-expressive in 
whatever way a self-transcendent agent must be in order to be self-transcendent. 
However, the trouble with this analysis of the case is that it doesn't allow the 
self-expression theorist to maintain a consistent account of the nature of the kind 
of self-expression thought to be necessary for freedom of will. To see this, con- 
sider another case: "The Aesthete" always chooses in such a way as to maxi- 
mize aesthetic value in the world, and is utterly unaware of either moral or 
prudential value. The Aesthete, for instance, might live in abject poverty so as 
to fund an elaborate and promising project involving thousands of clones of Paul 
Cezanne. When asked questions about why she does this, she eloquently extols 
the virtues of Cezanne's work and complains bitterly of the tragedy of his death 
at the age of 67 "Ten more years, and who knows what wonders he might have 
produced!". When asked about the hardships which she endures, and the situa- 
tion of the baby Cezannes in their hermetically sealed environments, she re- 
counts the facts with interest, but simply doesn't understand why anyone would 
see those facts as providing any reason even reasons outweighed by other 
reasons to abandon her project. 
Let's assume that the Aesthete has freedom of will on what grounds, af- 
ter all, could it be denied? The Aesthete is surely self-expressive a whole range 
of attitudes and dispositions that are very particular to her are expressed in her 
choices. But does she express those aspects of herself that are thought to be 
expressed by the Dutiful? No. The Aesthete exhibits nothing at all to suggest 
that she even possesses whatever dispositions, attitudes and states are required 
to recognize and respond to value appropriately. Thus, if the Dutiful is thought 
to be self-expressive, she is not self-expressive in the same sense as the Aes- 
thete. They have no form of self-expression in common; they don't express the 
same thing about themselves in their choices nor do they enjoy the same de- 
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gree of accordance between their choices and other attitudes (the Dutiful, after 
all, chooses contrary to her desiderative attitudes, the Aesthete in accordance 
with them).l7 So, either the Dutiful is a counterexample to the claim that self- 
expression is necessary for freedom of will, or else the Aesthete is. 
Freedom of Will II: The Conditions of Self-Transcendence 
In the last section I suggested that attempts to cash out freedom of will in 
terms of self-expression might come about through reflection on what exactly 
is appealing about the account of freedom of action sketched earlier. Impressed 
by the fact that an agent who has freedom of action expresses herself in her 
conduct, we come to think that freedom of will, too, must consist in some form 
of self-expression. There is, however, another possible moral to glean from the 
appeal of the account of freedom of action, a moral that leads us towards a 
self-transcendence view of freedom of will. 
As before, we can start with the following question: Even if freedom of 
action is not all that is involved in full-fledged freedom, why do we take it to 
capture any sense in which agents can be free? A possible answer to this ques- 
tion begins with a further question: why is it that dependence on the will of the 
agent, rather than on the agent's desires or whims, constitutes freedom of ac- 
tion? Perhaps the answer is that the will, as opposed to desire or whim, is ca- 
pable of picking out states of affairs as "to be achieved" by virtue of the objective 
(or at least inter-subjective) value of those states of affairs. In the sense of "de- 
sire" and "will" used here, recall, there are certain rationality conditions on 
willing that do not govern desire. And, we might say, such rationality condi- 
tions apply to willing because willing has a point: when functioning correctly, 
the will aims us towards states of affairs with a force proportionate to their 
value. The critical phrase in this last formulation is "when functioning correct- 
ly": there are, after all, countless examples of choices that fail to aim at what is 
really, genuinely, valuable. And, this line of thought continues, perhaps this is 
just what freedom of the will consists in: the right functioning of the will, where 
the will functions rightly when it leads us to, and is responsive to, the actual 
value of chosen states of affairs. 
Various theorist have reached this conclusion although not always by quite 
this route. In contemporary philosophy, views of this sort have been expressed 
by Robert Nozick, Susan Wolf, Sarah Buss, Paul Bensonl8 and in an interest- 
ingly different way by John Fischer and Mark Ravizza.l920 And this line of 
thought has a long and venerable tradition: leanings in this direction can be 
detected in the views of Aquinas, Descartes, Malebranche, Cudworth, Locke 
and Leibniz, to name a few.2l To think of freedom of will along these lines is to 
think of freedom of will as consisting in a kind of self-transcendence. If one's 
choices are attuned to the evaluative features of one's surroundings, then one's 
will is guided by something capable of providing a better grounding for choice 
than can be provided by oneself. This is not to say that the will is not also 
guided by oneself one may have an interest, either because of one's desires 
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or wishes or values, to be disposed to choices appropriate to the value of one's 
circumstances, or, perhaps, as discussed above, it is simply not possible to be 
responsive to value in one's choices without also responding to the exercise of 
certain capacities such as capacities for the recognition of the good. In either 
event, choices that are responsive to value might also be self-expressive, but 
what makes them instances of the exercise of freedom of will is, rather, that 
they are attuned to the facts about value, facts that are not reducible to facts 
about oneself. 
As in the case of the conditions of self-expression, satisfaction of the con- 
ditions of self-transcendence whatever they are is neither necessary nor suf- 
ficient for freedom of will. The following case is a counterexample to the 
necessity claim: "The Egoist" calmly and coolly assesses the value of the fea- 
tures of his circumstances and the likely results of his actions and chooses to 
act so as to further his own situation and satisfy as many of his own desires 
as possible, even if that involves trampling on the needs of others or in some 
other way realizing states of affairs that are intrinsically disvaluable. It seems 
clear enough that the Egoist possesses (or could possess) freedom of will. Does 
he transcend himself in his choices? Those who take satisfaction of the con- 
ditions of self-transcendence to be necessary for freedom of will are commit- 
ted to saying "yes". But the claim that the Egoist is self-transcendent is only 
plausible when an attenuated conception of self-transcendence is invoked, a 
conception that seems to collapse into little more than an equation between 
self-transcendence and the necessary conditions of freedom of will. If the de- 
termination to satisfy one's own needs at the expense of others counts as self- 
transcendence, as responsiveness to the evaluative facts, then self-transcendence 
is just another word for freedom of will.22 
The argument against the claim that self-transcendence is sufficient for free- 
dom of will is somewhat more complicated. The trouble is that it is possible 
for agent's dispositions to recognize and respond to value to be activated by a 
manipulator in order to serve the manipulator's particular ends. This is so in a 
wide range of cases of coercion. To take a mundane case, if someone holds a 
gun to your head and thereby induces you to choose to give her money, she 
does so by making so choosing the best of your options, and thereby activating 
your ability to recognize which of your options is best and choose accordingly. 
But she thereby undermines your freedom of will, without undermining your 
self-transcendence: you recognize which features of your circumstances rightly 
provide reason for choosing as you do most notably the manipulator's firm 
intention to kill you should you heroically refuse and you choose in a way 
appropriate to those reason-giving features. Such cases, then, appear to be cases 
of agents who are self-transcendent, but lack freedom of will. 
Just as the self-expression theorist, when faced with cases of brainwash- 
ing, felt the need to resist the first analysis of such cases by claiming that, in 
fact, they do not exemplify self-expression, the self-transcendence theorist will 
want to resist the natural conclusion to be drawn from coercion cases by claim- 
ing that they do not exemplify self-transcendence. A natural way to defend such 
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a view is by defining self-transcendence in such a way as to rule out the pos- 
sibility that the facts about value can be under the control of a manipulator 
while the agent is still self-transcendent. That is, one might say, to be self- 
transcendent is not to respond to the evaluative facts as they are, given the 
actions of a manipulator, but to respond to the evaluative facts as they would 
be in the absence of the manipulator's manipulations. The trouble with this an- 
swer is that it relies on an ad hoc distinction between the influence that a ma- 
nipulator can have on the evaluative facts and the influence that other, quite 
random, forces can have. I explain. 
Imagine a pair of cases: in the first, an agent faces a terrible result if she 
does not choose to A because a manipulator has promised to bring the terrible 
result about should she fail to so choose; in the second, the very same terrible 
result will come about if she fails to choose to A, but the result is assured be- 
cause of facts quite indifferent to the conduct of the agent. In the first case, for 
instance, an evil force will cause an agent to be crushed by an avalanche should 
she choose to take the right fork, while in the second, the avalanche will crush 
her in just the same way should she make such a choice only because of the 
precarious position of the snow. According to the line of thought under discus- 
sion, if both agents choose to take the left fork for the reasons supplied by the 
manipulator or the precarious position of the snow, respectively, then the first 
is not self-transcendent, while the second is. But why? What is it about the 
influence of another person which takes away the kind of responsiveness to the 
evaluative facts enjoyed by the second agent? 
Perhaps there is an answer to this question, but notice that any answer to it 
has a very difficult obstacle to overcome: while there might be something 
freedom-undermining about the influence of another person which could not 
be duplicated by indifferent forces perhaps, for instance, the crucial fact is 
that manipulators, unlike random forces, don't just aim at, but also track the 
compliance of their victims it isn't clear that any feature of manipulators could 
be found that isn't present also in cases in which we comply with the wishes of 
others and thereby reap advantage. To comply with a threat is to be unfree, to 
comply with an offer is not. The self-transcendence theorist, then, must be able 
to make both of two distinctions: a distinction between the effect on freedom 
of will of persons, on the one hand, versus natural forces, on the other; or a 
distinction between the effect on freedom of will of those who issue threats, on 
the one hand, and those who issue offers on the other. It isn't clear that a self- 
transcendence theorist can draw the first distinction without having trouble draw- 
ing the second, or draw the second without having trouble drawing the first. 
Freedom of Will and the Nature of Evaluative Concepts 
So, I take myself to have shown that neither self-expression nor self- 
transcendence is either necessary or sufficient for freedom of will. But there is 
something a little peculiar going on. The Dutiful seems to possess freedom of 
will by virtue of the fact that she is self-transcendent that would seem to sug- 
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gest that self-transcendence is sufficient for freedom of will, at least in that 
case. Similarly, the Egoist seems to possess freedom of will because she is self- 
expressive, and that would seem to suggest that self-expression is sufficient for 
freedom of will in her case. Further, in both cases, the relevant feature self- 
expression or self-transcendence seems necessary to the freedom of the indi- 
vidual described: if the Dutiful were to choose against all of her inclinations 
and desires but, at the same time, to fail to choose what she chooses because of 
the value of that choice, she would not be free; her choices would be unguided, 
they would be without satisfactory explanation. Similarly, if the Egoist consis- 
tently chose that which furthered her welfare but failed to express anything 
about herself, she would be, merely, a self-preservationist automata: a creature 
programmed to pursue her own welfare, but not because of anything deep or 
important about herself. 
What is going on? There are a couple of possibilities: perhaps, we have yet 
to identify the right feature of agents by virtue of which they are free; or, per- 
haps, freedom of will must be analyzed as some complicated combination of 
conjunctions and disjunctions of the conditions of self-expression and the con- 
ditions of self-transcendence. Nothing that I've said rules out either of these 
answers. But there is some reason to think a third answer to be the right one: 
perhaps freedom of will is a thick evaluative concept. 
Consider, first, an uncontroversial example of a thick concept: the concept 
of pretentiousness in art. We can imagine a series of descriptive features which 
contribute to, say, a novel's pretentiousness. For instance, if the dialogue in a 
novel is ponderous if, that is, characters are frequently making speeches that 
consist of little more than statements of their philosophical beliefs or their stances 
on broad moral issues this might contribute to the novel being pretentious.23 
A novel can be pretentious even if its dialogue is not ponderous and it can have 
ponderous dialogue and still avoid being pretentious that is, ponderous dia- 
logue is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a pretentious novel. But, none- 
theless, the ponderousness of the dialogue is one of the factors that can be fairly 
appealed to in an argument that a particular novel is pretentious. Pretentious- 
ness is a "thick concept": it is largely descriptive, but it also imputes to that to 
which it applies a particular form of disvalue. Determining whether or not the 
concept of pretentiousness applies to a novel is a matter of evaluatively weigh- 
ing the novel's descriptive features in order to determine whether or not, taking 
into consideration the evaluative impact of each of the features, the novel pos- 
sesses the particular form of disvalue that pretentious novels possess. 
Freedom of will, I suggest, is a concept on the model of the concept of 
pretentiousness. While there are certain descriptive features that agents pos- 
sess or lack that contribute to their having or lacking freedom of will in 
particular, those features that contribute to their being self-expressive or self- 
transcendent determining whether or not an agent possesses those features is 
not enough for determining whether or not the agent has or lacks freedom of 
will; we must also determine whether or not, by virtue of the possession of 
the particular combination of relevant descriptive features by the agent, the 
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series of factors that contribute, causally, to the production of the agent's choice 
possess or lack value. 
I am suggesting, then, that the agent who has freedom of will has choices 
that come about through worthwhile processes, processes possessing a certain 
kind of value; she approaches, thereby, an aspect of what we might call "agency 
at its best". If, in a particular circumstance, the attainment of self-transcendence 
requires the loss of some degree of self-expression, or vice versa, then it may 
be impossible for an agent to have all of the descriptive features relevant to free- 
dom of will. But such an agent can still attain freedom of will if, ultimately, by 
evaluatively weighing the particular degree to which she is self-transcendent at 
the expense of being self-expressive (or self-expressive at the expense of being 
self-transcendent) her choice-making processes realize, on balance, the appro- 
priate form of value. So, an agent has freedom of will when there is positive 
value to her choice-making mechanism, where the value of that mechanism is 
assessed by taking into consideration the value of both the degree to which she 
is self-expressive and the degree to which she is self-transcendent. 
This account can be formalized by specifying when it is that a particular 
feature, F, of an agent's circumstances or psychology, which causally contrib- 
utes to an agent making the choice that she makes, makes a positive or nega- 
tive contribution to the agent's freedom of will: 
F, a feature of an agent S's circumstances or psychology, makes a positive 
(negative) contribution to S's freedom of will iff F's presence contributes 
more positively (negatively) to S's condition evaluated with respect to S's 
self-expression or self transcendence than F contributes negatively (posi- 
tively) to S's condition evaluated with respect to the other trait.24 
Under this view, we can come to a judgment about an agent's freedom of will 
by applying this test to the conjunction of all the various factors that contribute 
causally to her choice. So, an agent possesses freedom of will without qualifi- 
cation, when F contributes positively to her freedom of will, and F consists of 
the conjunction of all the relevant features of her circumstances and psychology.25 
Why should we think this story might be right? The reason is that the con- 
cept of freedom of will functions in various ways that are best explained if 
freedom of will is a thick evaluative concept. Notice that we learn a lot about a 
person when we learn what she takes to undermine freedom and what she takes 
to be irrelevant to freedom. Political conservatives tend to be unwilling to with- 
hold responsibility from a person just by virtue of the fact that that person is a 
victim of childhood abuse, or an addict, because they tend to think that abuse 
or addiction do not detract from freedom. Political liberals, on the other hand, 
tend to be willing to take a wider class of appeals as legitimately undermining 
the appropriateness of moral censure. We might wonder why it is that one's 
political and moral stances should have any influence at all on one's judgments 
of freedom or unfreedom. Whether or not an agent is free is not a political 
issue although it has political repercussions in particular cases and so liber- 
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als and conservatives shouldn't disagree about who is free and who not; they 
should disagree only about, say, whether or not an agent needs to be free in 
order to be justly punished by the state, an argument that might turn on the 
nature and purpose of punishment by the state, but not on the nature of free- 
dom. If an agent's freedom is like any other descriptive trait of the agent if 
the question of whether or not an agent is free has the same status as the ques- 
tion of whether or not the agent was, say, born in Alaska then disagreements 
over value should not have an impact on rational assessments of an agent's 
freedom. 
But such disagreements do have an impact on the rational application of 
the concept of freedom of will. Perhaps this is precisely because whether or not 
an agent has or lacks freedom of will is, in part, a question of value; answering 
this question offering a judgment with respect to an agent's freedom of will- 
requires offering an assessment of the value or disvalue of the various aspects 
of her circumstances and psychology which contribute to the production of her 
choice. There is no reason to expect that such an assessment should, or even 
could, proceed independently of our evaluative dispositions and attitudes. 
It is a commonplace of aesthetic and moral evaluation that the degree of 
value that we fairly place on that which we are assessing is, in part, a function 
of what we take to be reasonable to expect from it. It is no fair criticism of a 
circus that it fails to probe into the nature of the human condition; it is no fair 
criticism of a small child that she fails to lend support to her parents during 
their divorce. This fact, I claim, together with the view of freedom I'm suggest- 
ing, helps us to explain our intricate intuitions concerning the effect of child- 
hood trauma on the freedom of the adult. A story about the childhood trauma 
endured by a seemingly wicked person can alter our evaluative tendencies, and 
thereby alter our judgment about the agent's freedom of will, by influencing 
our expectations regarding the degree of self-transcendence (or, in some cases, 
self-expression) that that agent might hope to have. 
For instance, imagine that we are given the details of a person's crime and 
shown that that person knew the evaluative facts and represented them appro- 
priately in her desires, but responded to those facts in a way that seemed to 
involve the taking of evil for good.26 Such an agent fails to be self-transcendent 
in her choices her choices are inappropriate to the evaluative facts but there 
is no reason to think that she is not self-expressive: we can imagine, for in- 
stance, that she wholeheartedly and unreservedly does evil, that it is really her 
doing it. Now imagine two different cases. In the first we are given a further 
story about the loving and supportive environment in which this criminal grew 
up, and the early penchant that she showed for the infliction of pain that even- 
tually developed into the enraged behavior that has characterized her adult- 
hood. In the second we are given a further story about the terrible abusive 
circumstances of her upbringing and the prolonged agonies with which she has 
been inflicted. Given the first agent's early dispositions and tendencies, there is 
little reason to ever have expected her to get any closer to self-transcendence 
than she has, and hence the only relevant factors in evaluating the impact of 
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her circumstances and psychology on her freedom of will are their impact on 
her degree of self-expression. But they have not contributed negatively to her 
tendency towards self-expression and so we judge her to have freedom of will. 
Or, to put the point slightly differently, when we see that she was not turned 
into a monster, but began with tendencies in that direction, it seems that the 
features that led to her criminal choices did not take anything from her, for we 
cannot reasonably expect her to have better dispositions towards choice in this 
respect. Neither have the circumstances of the second agent impugned her abil- 
ity for self-expression: she is a monster and her monstrous qualities are ex- 
pressed in her criminal choices. But in the case of the second agent, we think 
that she could have been self-transcendent; we think that she could have re- 
sponded to value appropriately if only she had not endured the childhood trauma 
she endured. It starts to seem, then, that in the case of the second agent the 
abuse she has endured has taken something from her that she very well could 
have had: a genuine interest in and attraction towards what is actually good, a 
form of self-transcendence.27 The circumstances of the second agent, then, seem 
to have taken freedom of will from her, for the disvalue of the impact of those 
circumstances, when assessed with respect to self-transcendence, has outweighed 
their value with respect to self-expression, because, as we learn from the story 
of her childhood trauma, there was more for her to lose than the first agent ever 
could. Various pieces of information in this case information about the child- 
hood histories of agents effect our evaluative stances by setting baselines for 
evaluative judgment, and thereby effect our assessments of freedom of will. 
Given the diagnosis of our intuitions about childhood trauma that I am of- 
fering, it might be objected, genetic flaws that give rise to, say, violent adult 
behaviors would not detract from freedom of will. But this seems wrong. 
Wouldn't we be more likely, the objection goes, to think someone's choice to 
perform a violent act to be made without freedom of will when that choice is 
the consequence of flaws in genetic make-up? This objection assumes, how- 
ever, that the self is not something separate from those aspects of oneself that 
are dictated by one's genetic make-up. If genetic make-up is something that is 
imposed on the agent, in something analogous to the way in which childhood 
trauma is imposed on the agent, then our intuitions with regard to its impact on 
freedom can be analyzed in just the same way as childhood trauma: we will be 
likely to see it as detracting from freedom of will since it takes something away 
from the agent that she might have otherwise had (namely self-transcendence). 
However, if genetic make-up is constitutive of the self if there is really no 
meaning to the thought that one is acted on by one's genetic make-up since 
there is no self to be acted on prior to the having of some genetic make-up- 
then it is not possible to think of genetic make-up as something that detracts 
from freedom of will. In this event, it doesn't detract from self-expression and 
it can only be thought to detract from self-transcendence if we can meaning- 
fully imagine the very same agent as having a different genetic make-up. This 
is really a point about essential properties: essential properties of agents cannot 
be meaningfully examined for their impact on freedom of will, since assess- 
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ments of freedom of will require evaluative comparison between an agent who 
has and an agent who lacks the relevant property. When the property is essen- 
tial, this comparison cannot be meaningfully made. 
How do we go about weighing the evaluative importance of self-expression 
and self-transcendence, in a particular case, in order to decide whether or not 
and to what degree an agent possesses freedom of will? Unfortunately and 
this is why this paper offers only a strategy for developing a view of freedom 
of will rather than a full-blooded view of its own I cannot really answer this 
question here. (How do we go about weighing, say, ponderousness and breadth 
of subject matter in determining the pretentiousness of a novel? The answer 
would require an essay of its own.) I take myself to have provided an account 
of which features are relevant to the application of the concept of freedom of 
will, and some reasons for thinking that their relevance is evaluative. But this 
leaves open the question of how, precisely, they are to be weighed, and without 
such an account it is impossible to say, in particular cases, which agents have 
freedom of will and which lack it. 
Evaluation often proceeds in front of a background of purposes: when en- 
gaging in the kind of evaluation typical of legal thought, for instance, we keep 
an eye towards maximizing two potentially conflicting goods: the good of so- 
ciety and the good of individual members of the society. This complicated dual 
interest influences our judgments of legal responsibility.28 When making cer- 
tain sorts of aesthetic judgments those typical in the criticism of art we en- 
ter into the evaluative process with an interest in certain sorts of pleasure that 
can be found from the engagement with art objects, and which might, for in- 
stance, lead us to ignore the social good or evil consequences of the art object. 
We can expect evaluative judgments to vary in so far as we enter into the eval- 
uative process with varying aims and interests. And, to the degree that this is 
so, what has been suggested here is that we can expect our judgments with 
respect to freedom of will to vary with our evaluative purposes and interests. 
We can expect, for instance, that our judgment that a particular criminal meets 
or fails to meet mens rea criteria in the criminal law to be different from the 
judgment that we make with respect to the very same agent's freedom of will 
when we are thinking of moral, rather than legal, responsibility. Depending on 
our purposes in inquiring about a particular agent's freedom of will, we may 
weigh self-expression or self-transcendence to different degrees in coming to 
our all things considered judgment of the value of the impact of the agent's 
circumstances and psychology on her will. If the rather tentative suggestion 
being made here is right, then an agent's freedom of will is to be judged by 
appropriately situated judges rather than metaphysicians.29 
Notes 
1. Sometimes thoughts of this sort are expressed not by appealing to what we choose, 
but, instead, by appealing to what we want or what we desire. However, as long as 
we take the will to be a distinctive capacity, different from the capacity for desire 
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(as I do see the later remarks in the main text), there are obvious counterexamples 
to formulations in terms of desires or wants. I express this familiar thought in terms 
of choice, then, since I take it to be the strongest formulation. 
2. For examples of theorists who have followed each of these various directions of 
thought, see the later sections entitled "Freedom of Will I: The Conditions of Self- 
Explession" and "Freedom of Will II: The Conditions of Self-Transcendence". 
3. See Wolf, Freedom Within Reason, p. 72. 
4. One of the earliest usages of the term "thick concept" is in Williams, Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy, p. 129. 
5. It is in this sense that Michael Smith uses the term desire; cf The Moral Problem, 
pp. 7-8. See also G. F. Schueler, Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Ex- 
planation of Action, especially the introduction and pp. 29-41, for a useful discus- 
sion of this and another conception of desire. 
6. We sometimes use the term "desire" to refer not to an occurrent mental state but to 
a disposition to be in a certain occurrent state in certain circumstances. This is what 
we mean when we say, of the sleeping child, "She want to please her Daddy." We 
don't think she wants this right this second, but would in certain appropriate cir- 
cumstances. As I am using the terms, the dispositional state being referred to here is 
not a desire but merely a disposition to have certain desires. 
7. In his excellent book Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Michael Bratman iden- 
tifies a series of norms of rationality governing intentions and other acts of will. 
See, especially, chapter 2. 
8. Hobbes' view of freedom is expressed most clearly and explicitly in his essay "Of 
Liberty and Necessity". Following the publication of this essay, Hobbes engaged in 
an extensive correspondence over the issues with Bishop Bramhall. Hobbes's essay 
and much of the correspondence between Hobbes and Bramhall appears in Vere 
Chappell's Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity. 
9. This condition could be formulated, with a little ingenuity, in any tense. I use the 
present tense here only for convenience. 
10. Alternatively, the second of these conditional might be formulated as follows: (2') 
If she chooses to refrain from A, she will refrain from A. What makes (2) preferable 
to (2') is that we can construct cases in which an agent can only avoid A-ing by 
making no choice with respect to A. If, for instance, whenever I choose to refrain 
from tripping, I get so nervous that I trip, then I cannot avoid tripping by choosing 
to refrain from tripping. But I might, nonetheless be free, in some weak sense, with 
respect to tripping since I can avoid tripping by thinking of other things and thereby 
making no choice in favor or against tripping. 
11. The objection was posed to Hobbes by Bramhall. See The English Works of Tho- 
mas Hobbes, v. 5, cf. pp. 40-41. Or Chappell, Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty 
and Necessity, pp. 43-44. Bramhall puts the objection slightly differently than I do 
in the main text; but, Bramhall does emphasize that, according to Hobbes' defini- 
tion of freedom, even creatures such as madmen and children creatures who have 
no control ovel what they choose are still free. 
12. This objection is no different from the objection posed to conditional analyses of 
"can" by Roderick Chisholm. Chisholm claims that for it to be the case that an 
agent can do something it must be the case that she can choose to do it, and points 
out that advocates of the conditional analysis don't require this further condition 
(see Chisholm, "Human Freedom and the Self", p. 27). In my opinion, Chisholm is 
simply sensing that it is possible to undermine freedom by tampering with the way 
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an agent chooses without thereby tampering with the way the agent acts given her 
choices. 
13. It is possible that views of this sort are not so far away from agent-causal theories 
of the sort that begin with Thomas Reid and continue in the work of Roderick 
Chisholm and, more recently, Timothy O'Connor and Randolph Clarke. (Reid, Es- 
says on the Active Powers of Man, especially Essay IV, chapters 1 and 2; Chish- 
olm, "Human Freedom and the Self"; O'Connor, "Agent Causation" and Clarke, 
"Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will".) The agent causal theo- 
rists do not describe their project as one of unpacking the conditions of self- 
expression, but, nonetheless, their project can be construed in this way. The agent 
causalists are concerned that if events or states, rather than agents, are the causes 
of conduct, then the critical fact about agents by virtue of which they are agents 
will remain unexpressed in conduct. That is, they take capability for action inde- 
pendent of the causal influence of any particular states or events to be the crucial 
agency-defining feature and think that choices that are not expressive of this 
feature by virtue of being caused by the agent herself are thus not free. Thus, 
the Frankfurtian and Reidian projects all aim to capture some sense in which our 
choices can succeed or fail to be self-expressive. The views differ in that Frank- 
furt (and those who offer related theories) attempt to capture the relevant sort of 
self-expression by appealing to certain crucial elements of the agent's psyche in 
Frankfurt's original paper he appealed to what he called "second-order volitions"- 
and the relationship that they bear to other elements such as choices. The agent 
causal theorists, on the other hand, try to capture the special kind of self-expression 
by appealing to a special kind of cause: an agent, irreducible to any particular 
features of the agent. 
14. The distinction between Frankfurt's willing addict and a recreational drug-user- 
someone who is not addicted but acts on a desire to take a drug and has an appro- 
priate higher order attitude in support of that desire must be made by appeal to 
dependence between the higher order attitude and the effective first order desire. 
The recreational drug-user's desire for the drug would not be effective were she not 
to have the higher order attitude in favor of it; not so for the willing addict. This 
difference is a difference in self-expression, and thus the degree of self-expression 
enjoyed by an agent, under Frankfurt's view, is a function, in part, of the counter- 
factuals which the actual causal sequence leading to choice possesses. 
15. See, for instance, Frankfurt's "Identification and Externality", "Identification and 
Wholeheartedness" and "The Faintest Passion". 
16. See, for instance, Friedman, "Autonomy and the Split-Level View.", Neely, "Free- 
dom and Desire", Stump, "Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart and Frankfurt's 
Concept of Free Will", Watson, "Free Agency" and Young, "Autonomy and the 'In- 
ner Self'". 
17. It remains open to the self-expression theorist to claim that, despite appearances to 
the contrary, the Dutiful and the Aesthete have some form of self-expression in com- 
mon, or to claim that the requisite form of self-expression is disjunctive (an agent 
must express herself either in the way the Dutiful does or else in the way the Aes- 
thete does, or...), but this further squirming would seem to have diminishing returns 
in the form of loss of unity in the concept of self-expression. 
18. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, pp. 317-362; Wolf, Freedom Within Reason, 
especially chapter 4; Buss, "Autonomy Reconsidered", and Benson, "Freedom and 
Value". 
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19. See Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will, especially chapter 8, and Fischer and 
Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Fischer and 
Ravizza see the right functioning of the will, to use my terminology, as consisting 
in choice-producing mechanisms that are "reasons-responsive" in a special sense 
that they make an effort to define. Their central idea, however, involves thinking of 
freedom of will as consisting in routes to choice that are grounded in and respon- 
sive to features of circumstances that are relevant to making right choices, where 
"right choices" are just those supported appropriately by reasons. Put in this way, 
their view does seem to involve something like the strategy that I am discussing. 
20. The view expressed in the works of Michael Smith (both by himself and with Jean- 
nette Kennett and Philip Pettit see Pettit and Smith, "Backgrounding Desire" and 
"Freedom in Belief and Desire", and Kennett and Smith, "Frog and Toad Lose Con- 
trol", and Smith, "A Theory of Freedom and Responsibility") probably also belongs 
in this category. However, Smith et al's insistence that the aspect of their view which 
sounds like an account of self-transcendence is not rightly called autonomy, but, 
instead "orthonomy", suggests that they are not thinking of the view in quite the 
way that I am suggesting. 
21. This is obviously not the place for a full discussion of the views of these various 
figures. A small sampling of texts that might begin to justify my sweeping histori- 
cal claim here: Aquinas, especially Summa Theologica I.q 83, I-II.q 8, I-II.q 10; 
Descartes, especially the Fourth Meditation, AT VII 57-58; Malebranche, Treatise 
on Nature and Grace, especially Discourse III, sections 8-10; Cudworth, A Treatise 
Concerning True and Immutable Morality, notably pp. 26-27, and Treatise of Free 
Will, especially chapter 8; Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
II.XXI especially II.XXI.48-50; Leibniz, Theodicy, especially part I section 45, part 
II sections 228-235, and part III sections 310 and 319. For a discussion of the role 
that this line of thought plays in Locke's view of free agency, see my Liberty Worth 
the Nclme: Locke on Free Agency, especially chapter 1. 
22. It might be argued, I suppose, that self-transcendence doesn't require actually choos- 
ing rightly, but, rather, choosing in a way that correctly takes into account where 
the good lies. Under this conception of self-transcendence, even the Egoist can be 
self-transcendent since he might carefully take into account what it is actually best 
for him to do and simply decide to do what furthers his own interests. He is respon- 
sive to the evaluative facts on this model, he just doesn't respond to them in the 
ideal way. 
This conception of self-transcendence will only seem a viable theoretical op- 
tion to those who take a strictly non-internalist conception of value properties. That 
is, those who think that to judge a particular possible one of one's actions to be 
morally valuable is to be motivated to perform it don't allow for the possibility that 
one could correctly judge a particular action to be the best of one's options and not 
be motivated to perform it more strongly than one is motivated to perform any 
other action. Thus, moral judgment internalists cannot accept the account of self- 
transcendence under discussion here. However, there may be room for those who 
reject moral judgment internalism to dispute the claim that the Egoist is a counter- 
example to the necessity of self-transcendence for freedom. 
23. We might worry that the concept of ponderousness is itself a thick concept. Let's 
assume that it is not. Let's assume, that is, that something like the descriptive defi- 
nition of ponderousness given in the main text is correct. 
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24. Notice that it is unclear in the absence of further argument whether or not determin- 
ism undermines freedom on this account. In principle, at least, it could be argued 
that deterministic choice-producing mechanisms possess disvalue, that their effect 
on self-expression and self-transcendence are, in the end, evaluatively negative. I 
myself do not know of a satisfying argument to this effect, but I leave it to others to 
debate the issue. Notice, however, that if it can be shown that the truth of determin- 
ism does not undermine the possibility of choice-producing mechanisms that allow 
either self-expression or self-transcendence, or both, then the theory will turn out to 
be compatibilist. 
25. In "Self Deception and Responsibility for the Self", Stephen White reaches the fol- 
lowing conclusion regarding the impact of self-deception on responsibility: 
We must drop the assumption that our practices of ascribing responsibility could 
have a justification in which discriminations in our ascriptions to different sub- 
jects are justified by differences in the intrinsic properties of those subjects' 
psychologies. (p. 478) 
While the suggestion I am making is not as strong as this for all that has been 
said, the value of the mechanism through which a person's choice comes about might 
supervene entirely on "intrinsic properties" of that mechanism there is some af- 
finity between White's view and the view I am suggesting. 
26. An example, perhaps, of such a case is discussed at length by Gary Watson in his 
enormously thought-provoking article "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Vari- 
ations on a Strawsonian Theme". 
27. Some readers may be disturbed by my usages of "could" here. After all, they might 
say, exactly what we are trying to understand when we give accounts of freedom is 
in what sense, exactly, alternative scenarios need to be available to agents for free- 
dom. But, the sense of "could" I am invoking is very wan indeed and gets nowhere 
near amounting to the "could" analyzed by an adequate account of freedom. In par- 
ticular, there is no reason to think that the agent herself could have done anything 
to bring it about that she be closer to being self-transcendent; it is simply the case 
that under different early influences, she would have come to have a different char- 
acter, and not through any action on her part. 
28. See Feinberg, "Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals" for a marvelous dis- 
cussion of the ways in which the purposes which we have when assessing legal 
responsibility differ from those involved in assessing moral responsibility. 
29. Thanks to Sarah Buss, Vere Chappell, Phillip Clark, Andrew Eschelman, John Fis- 
cher, Paul Hoffman, Elijah Millgram, John Perry, Vance Ricks, Jennifer Rosner, Mar- 
leen Rozemond, Kadri Vihvelin, and Gary Watson for comments on this paper or its 
recent ancestors. Portions of this material were presented to the philosophy depart- 
ments at the University of California at Irvine and Arizona State University. In both 
cases I received valuable comments. Special thanks to Michael Bratman for his in- 
finite willingness to re-read, and for always seeing exactly what needs to be fixed. 
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